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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 14-1438 
___________ 
 
JOSE ORLANDO TITO VERDI, 
   Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
____________________________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A205-753-310) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Leo Finston 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
July 1, 2014 
Before:  HARDIMAN, NYGAARD and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: July 2, 2014) 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Jose Orlando Tito Verdi petitions for review of a final order of removal.  For the 
following reasons, we will deny the petition. 
 Verdi, a native and citizen of Peru, entered the United States in 2006 and 
overstayed his visa.  The Government started removal proceedings on that basis in 2013.   
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See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B).  Verdi chose to represent himself in the proceedings after 
being advised by the Immigration Judge (IJ) of his rights and receiving a list of legal 
service providers.
1
  Administrative Record (“A.R.”) at 64-65.  Verdi conceded that he 
was removable as charged and did not apply for any relief.  In addition, Verdi did not 
identify any potential grounds for relief after being questioned by the IJ.  He testified 
that:  (1) he had not been mistreated in Peru and did not fear returning there; (2) he is not 
married and has no children; (3) no petition had ever been filed on his behalf; and (4) his 
parents have no legal status in the United States.  Id. at 67-68.  After Verdi testified that 
he had been assaulted by thieves and the police in the United States, the IJ asked if he had 
cooperated in any investigation or prosecution, and Verdi testified that he had not.  Id. at 
68-69.  At that point, the IJ noted that Verdi appeared to be eligible only for voluntary 
departure, but Verdi declined because he could not accomplish the necessary steps.  Id. at 
69, 72-73.  Ultimately, the IJ found Verdi removable based on his factual admissions and 
concession of removability.  The IJ ordered Verdi’s removal, concluding that he was not 
eligible for any form of relief, including a U visa. 
 On appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), Verdi asked for his 
removal to be cancelled and his case remanded to a state court because he believed that 
his immigration proceedings had been “rushed” due to state police officers fearing that he 
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 The proceedings were continued for Verdi to obtain counsel, but he never did. 
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would file a lawsuit against them.  The BIA concluded that the allegation was not 
germane to removability or relief therefrom and affirmed the IJ’s decision because Verdi 
had not satisfied his burden to establish eligibility for relief.  The present petition for 
review followed. 
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a).  Where, as here, the BIA 
issues its own decision on the merits, we review that decision and consider the IJ’s ruling 
“only insofar as the BIA deferred to it.”  Roye v. Att’y Gen., 693 F.3d 333, 339 (3d Cir. 
2012).  We review the agency’s factual findings for substantial evidence.  Dia v. 
Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 228, 247 (3d Cir. 2003).  This is a deferential standard, and the 
“BIA’s determination will not be disturbed unless any reasonable adjudicator would be 
compelled to conclude to the contrary.”  Yu v. Att’y Gen., 513 F.3d 346, 348 (3d Cir. 
2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 Verdi was charged with being removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B) for 
staying in the United States longer than permitted by his visa.  During the immigration 
proceedings, Verdi admitted that he:  (1) is a native and citizen of Peru; (2) was admitted 
to the United States as a temporary visitor in 2006 with authorization to remain until May 
4, 2007; and (3) remained in the United States after that date without authorization.  He 
also conceded that he was removable as charged.  Verdi has not challenged this 
determination.  We conclude that substantial evidence supports the determination that 
Verdi is removable pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B) . 
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 As for relief from removal, the burden of proof to establish eligibility for it rests 
upon the alien.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(4).  In this case, Verdi did not apply for relief.  
Nor did he establish any potential basis for it through his testimony, despite the IJ’s 
inquiries on the subject.  Accordingly, we conclude that substantial evidence supports the 
determination that Verdi did not establish eligibility for relief from removal. 
 On appeal, Verdi raises a due process challenge to aspects of the immigration 
proceedings.  He contends that his rights were violated when:  (1) immigration 
proceedings were initiated before “his criminal case was resolved;” (2) the IJ failed to 
find out why he could not meet the conditions for voluntary departure; and (3) the IJ 
failed to advise him of his right to a U visa.
2
  To the extent that Verdi argues that he was 
deprived of a fundamentally fair hearing, we conclude that the claim fails because he has 
not demonstrated that he was substantially prejudiced.  See, e.g., Khan v. Att’y Gen., 448 
F.3d 226, 236 (3d Cir. 2006) (“‘[d]ue process challenges to deportation proceedings 
require an initial showing of substantial prejudice’”) (quoting Anwar v. INS, 116 F.3d 
140, 144 (5th Cir. 1997)). 
 Regarding the first claim, Verdi states that the “outcome of his criminal case will 
impact his eligibility for relief in his immigration proceedings,” apparently asserting a 
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 Verdi did not raise these claims before the BIA and they are thus not exhausted.  
However, due process claims are generally exempt from the exhaustion requirement, and 
we will review de novo the question of whether Verdi’s rights were violated.  See Mudric 
v. Att’y Gen., 469 F.3d 94, 98 (3d Cir. 2006). 
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right to defer the immigration proceedings on that basis.  Verdi does not explain his 
criminal case, its status, or how it could possibly affect his eligibility for relief.  
Furthermore, we note that Verdi was found removable for overstaying his visa, not for a 
criminal conviction.  There is no apparent connection between those proceedings and the 
immigration proceedings.  He thus fails to establish any prejudice flowing from the 
timing of his immigration proceedings. 
 As for Verdi’s claim that the IJ violated his rights by failing to ascertain why he  
could not meet the conditions for voluntary departure, he cites no authority for the 
proposition that the IJ had a duty to undertake such an inquiry.  That is not surprising, 
given that the burden is on the alien to establish eligibility for relief, as noted earlier  
Furthermore, Verdi declined to apply for voluntary departure and has never claimed that 
he could meet the eligibility criteria.  On the contrary, his argument is premised on his 
inability to meet the criteria, which completely undermines any ability to show prejudice 
from the alleged violation of his rights. 
 Finally, Verdi claims that the IJ did not advise him of his right to a U visa.  Verdi 
had no “right” to such a visa, and indeed, did not establish eligibility.  Eligibility for a U 
visa is generally predicated on assisting law enforcement with the investigation or 
prosecution of a crime.  See 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(b).  Verdi testified that he had not 
provided such assistance when questioned by the IJ.  As he was not eligible for a U visa, 
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there was no reason for the IJ to advise him about it and no prejudice from the failure to 
do so.
3
 
 For these reasons, we will deny the petition for review. 
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 The authority cited by Verdi in support of this claim, 8 C.F.R. § 1240.11 and decisions 
from the Ninth Circuit, do not affect this analysis.  The decisions are not binding on this 
Court, and neither they nor the regulation concern U visas or situations where there was 
no potential eligibility for such relief.  
